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UNDERSTANDING THE DECLINE IN TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION
CHANNELS: WHETHER THE CHILDREN IN FAMILIES FIRST
ACT IS AN EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO THE
EXPLOITATION OF ORPHANS
Jade Gary*
I. Introduction
In less than ten years, the number of transnational adoptions throughout the
world has plummeted by fifty percent.1 What could explain such a rapid decline
in transnational adoptions? Perhaps a low demand from prospective parents
seeking children? Not likely. During the 1990s, the opening of transnational
adoption proceedings in China and Russia alone caused a dramatic surge in transnational adoptions that lasted well into the 21st century.2 Could the recent decline in transnational adoptions be due to a decreasing number of available
orphans? Again, this is unlikely. In fact, many developing nations have experienced a rise in the number of children living without families or permanent
homes.3
The decline stems from the indefinite suspension of transnational adoptions in
several developing nations.4 These adoption moratoriums are implemented in an
effort to encourage adoption reform in impoverished countries; however, they

1 Peter Selman, The Rise and Fall of Intercountry Adoptions in the 21st Century, 52 INT’L SOC.
WORK 575, 578 (2009) [hereinafter Selman 2009]; see also Peter Selman, Key Tables for Intercountry
Adoption: Receiving States 2003-2012, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/selmanstats33.pdf (A
survey by Newcastle University of the top 23 nations that adopt children from abroad reported approximately 23,601 transnational adoptions in 2011, a decline from the recorded 45,299 in 2004).
2 Peter Selman, Global Trends in Intercountry Adoption: 2001-2010, 44 ADOPTION ADVOC. 1, 4
(2012) (Between 2000 and 2010, citizens from 27 countries adopted more than 400,000 children, the
highest number for any decade).
3 Kevin Voigt et al., International Adoptions Decline as Number of Orphans Grows, CNN (2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/16/world/international-adoption-main-story-decline/ (An increase in the
number of orphans is evident in developing nations experiencing political or societal instability such as
Russia, following the break-up of the Soviet Union, and China, where the nation’s One-Child Policy left
a surplus of abandoned infant girls. Since 2004, the number of children in Chinese orphanages has risen
nearly fifty percent).
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4 Selman, supra note 2, at 14 (For example, the decline of transnational adoptions to the United
States in the 21st century is largely due to the continuing moratorium on adoptions from Guatemala); see
also Selman 2009, supra note 1, at 590 (Transnational adoptions from countries like Romania, Bulgaria,
Russia, and Belarus rapidly decreased for many western nations partially due to pressures from the European Union as well as an overall reaction in the global community to nations following poorly controlled
adoption practices).
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II. Background
The demand for transnational adoptions is directly correlated with domestic
living conditions and international relations, such as periods of war and civil
See Yemm, infra notes 113 and accompanying text.

6

See National Council for Adoption, infra note 112 and accompanying text.

7

See Thompson, infra note 9, at 451.

8

Id. at 450.
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usually have no such effect.5 Instead, most orphaned children remain in subpar
foster-care facilities, waiting years for adoption suspensions to be lifted.6 Others
become homeless, forced out of orphanages once they surpass the legal age to
qualify for adoption.7 These children are not only susceptible to exploitation but
are also influenced by crime in their environment.8
This Comment will address whether the proposed Children in Families First
Act (“CHIFF”) will effectively counter the decline in transnational adoption
channels, address corrupt transnational adoption practices, and accelerate the
transnational adoption process for deserving families. In addition, this Comment
will determine if the Act serves as an effective model for further transnational
adoption reform. While the issue of regulating transnational adoption practices is
complex, it is an important initiative to address because providing a safe environment for orphaned children will require a global effort that extends beyond the
legal realm.
Part II – Background of this Comment will detail the landscape of transnational adoption and how foreign adoptions rose in popularity in the United States.
Part III – Around the World will explore how the industry has spawned a
black market consisting of child exploitation and commodification, through examining adoption issues in various countries around the world.
Part IV – Transnational Adoption Legislation will examine current adoption
legislation, which serves as the foundation for future reform and the impact current policy has had on the transnational adoption arena.
Part V – The Breakdown of CHIFF will look at the CHIFF bill and describe its
provisions that are most relevant to transnational adoption reform.
Part VI – Analysis will provide an analysis of the impact CHIFF will have on
transnational adoptions and the global community in implementing social and
policy reform.
Part VII – Proposal will recommend necessary changes to legislation and social norms that will address corrupt adoption practices and enable the reopening
of adoption channels.
Part VIII – Conclusion will close by emphasizing that while CHIFF sets forth
effective legislative measures to address child exploitation and the decline in
transnational adoption channels, additional steps are necessary to produce longlasting change.
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unrest.9 Often, these periods leave impoverished nations in turmoil and families
dismantled.10 As a reoccurring and long-standing trend, war-torn nations typically experience an increase in the number of children left homeless and parentless.11 Fortunately, transnational adoption acts as an avenue for outside nations
to provide assistance to these children.12 The aftermath of World War II left
numerous Belgian, Polish, German, Greek, and Italian children displaced, resulting in the first major wave of transnational adoptions.13 In the years following
the Korean War, specifically between 1953 and 1981, a second wave ensued as
many Korean children were products of interracial relationships between United
States soldiers and Korean natives.14 In the past few decades, transnational adoptions have continued to grow in popularity, particularly among American
families.15
Acts of child exploitation, such as prostitution, trafficking, and kidnapping,
plague the current landscape of transnational adoptions as nations try to meet
high demands.16 Commodification of human beings, specifically within the sex
trade, is a rapidly growing industry that generates billions of dollars in profit
worldwide.17 Understanding the current landscape of transnational adoption is
imperative in order to facilitate effective change that could potentially address
the wide range of concerns various nations have.
III. Around the World
In recent years, the detection of corrupt practices in transnational adoption has
prompted legislative reform by political leaders seeking to promote domestic
adoption efforts in their countries over the interests of foreign adoptive parents.18
In examining the landscape of transnational adoption, this Comment will first
explore the transnational adoption programs in the parts of the world that are
most plagued by corrupt adoption practices.

Today, China is the world’s largest provider of orphans for transnational adoption, and American families have adopted approximately 80% of the nation’s
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9 Notesong-Srisopark Thompson, Hague is Enough?: A Call For More Protective, Uniform Law
Guiding International Adoptions, 22 WIS. INT’L L.J. 441, 441 (2004).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 442.
13 Id. at 445.
14 Thompson, supra note 9, at 445.
15 Id. at 444.
16 Id. at 448.
17 Richard Poulin, Globalization and the Sex Trade: Trafficking and the Commodification of Women
and Children, 22 CANADIAN WOMAN STUD./ LES CAHIERS DE LA FEMME 34, 38 (2003).
18 Jorge L. Carro, Regulation of Intercountry Adoption: Can the Abuses Come to an End?, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 121, 133 (1994).
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adoptees since China instituted its adoption program in the 1990s.19 In 2013
alone, American families adopted 2,306 Chinese children.20 China’s efforts to
control its population growth caused many families to abandon their children
during the nation’s “One-Child Policy,” which limited urban families to one child
in order to avoid harsh fines by the Chinese government.21 In addition, the nation’s societal preference for birthing boys resulted in an overwhelming amount
of orphaned girls.22 This deluge of orphans has been the primary factor in the
government’s history of promoting foreign adoptions.23
In 2005, the Chinese government uncovered a baby trafficking ring involving
six orphanages of the Hunan province in what became known as the Hunan
Baby-Trafficking Scandal.24 These orphanages matched thousands of Western
adoptive parents with children procured from traffickers, and while it is unknown
exactly how the traffickers obtained the children, abduction is a common
method.25 Traffickers often target poor, migrant workers and offer to purchase
their children for meager compensation.26 The Hunan Baby-Trafficking Scandal
resulted in the prosecution and conviction of nine known traffickers and the suspension of all Hunan Province adoptions for several months.27 Since the incident, media outlets have reported numerous cases of baby-buying and abduction
in the Chinese transnational adoption program.28
Cambodia’s adoption system is substantially more anarchic than that of China.
A 2006 End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Trafficking (“ECPAT”)
International report identified children living within the seven provinces of Cambodia as particularly vulnerable to adult predators due to cultural and sociological
factors.29 The country has been subjected to decades of societal turmoil and political unrest stemming specifically from a period known as the Khmer Rouge.30
From 1975 to 1979, the Cambodian government committed a nationwide genocide of two million people leading to the systematic destruction of all religious,

20 Adoption Statistics, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
adoption.state.gov/about_us/statistics.php (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
21

Id. at 95.

22

Id.

23

Id. at 97.

24

Meier, supra note 19, at 88.

25

Id. at 90, 97.

OF

STATE (2013) http://
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Id. at 109.
Id. at 89.
28 Id. at 90.
29 ECPAT GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT ON THE STATUS OF ACTION AGAINST COMMERCIAL SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN: CAMBODIA, ECPAT INTERNATIONAL 11 (2006), available at http://resources.ecpat.net/A4A_2005/PDF/EAP/Global_Monitoring_Report-CAMBODIA.pdf (ECPAT or End
Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Trafficking, is a global non-profit organization dedicated to
protecting children from all forms of commercial sexual exploitation).
30 Tim Hunn, Child Sex Trafficking: Why Cambodia?, CNN (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/
2013/12/09/world/asia/cambodia-cfr-why-history-child-sex-trafficking/index.html?iref=allsearch.
27
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19 Patricia J. Meier & Xiaole Zhang, Sold Into Adoption: The Hunan Baby Trafficking Scandal Exposes Vulnerabilities in Chinese Adoptions to the United States, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 87, 93 (2008-2009).
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educational, and social structures, including the family unit.31 With this deterioration, the country has essentially lost and not yet recovered the moral compass
that Buddhism once provided.32 The instability left many children and families
vulnerable to black market sellers.33 Such widespread baby trafficking, child
prostitution, and adoption fraud led the United States to halt all adoption proceedings with Cambodia in 2001.34
The International Human Services (“INS”) reported that adoption services and
orphan visa petitions for the children of Cambodia would remain suspended until
the country partook in more transparent practices that were consistent with transnational adoption standards.35 Twelve years after the moratorium was initially
issued, Cambodian adoptions remain banned in the United States and the country
is still subject to lengthy adoption investigations.36 Furthermore, Cambodian law
prohibits children over the age of eight from being adopted, forcing many orphans to care for themselves in substandard living conditions after they have
outgrown their right to be adopted.37
Latin America

31
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Id.
Id.
33 Thompson, supra note 9, at 448 (Black market sellers that partake in selling orphaned children
typically operate by persuading desperate families to sell their children for a profit).
34 Id. at 448-49.
35 Id. at 449.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 451.
38 Lisa M. Yemm, International Adoption and the “Best Interests” of the Child: Reality and Reactionism in Romania and Guatemala, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 555, 569-570 (2010).
39 Karen Smith Rotabi et al., Intercountry Adoption Reform Based on the Hague Convention on
Intercountry Adoption: An Update on Guatemala in 2008, SOCMAG NEWS MAG. (Nov. 29, 2008), http://
www.socmag.net/?p=435.
40 Yemm, supra note 38, at 568.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 568-69.
32
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In Latin America, particularly Guatemala, parental-consented and non-consented child commodification is common.38 Typically, when children are sold
for a profit to orphanages, the facilities falsify birth documentation to depict a
legitimate adoption to prospective parents.39 Similar to the predicament in countries like China and Cambodia, years of civil unrest in Guatemala have resulted
in widespread poverty and an increased number of orphaned children.40 The average Guatemalan woman bears six children in her lifetime and in recent years,
transnational adoption has been a means to fulfill the needs of many of these
children who are eventually abandoned.41 Initially, Guatemala’s adoption system
was comprised mostly of private adoptions negotiated by facilitators, attorneys,
and government actors, which made the process quick for prospective parents.42
The system consisted of unregulated foster care providers who lacked any train-
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ing or standards of care.43 Providers were recruited and paid by private attorneys
who often failed to report the number of children in care, information about the
caregiver, or the amount of money exchanged for services.44 This laxity in Guatemala’s system fostered an environment for baby trafficking, and in 2000 the
United Nations concluded:
[L]egal adoption appears to be the exception rather than the rule. . .The
child has become an object of commerce rather than the focus of the law.
It would seem that in the majority of cases, transnational adoption involves a variety of criminal offenses including the buying and selling of
children, the falsifying of documents, [and] the kidnapping of children.45

The United States has since halted all adoptions from Guatemala.46 In 2008,
Guatemala formed a central adoption authority and began taking steps to reform
its system by complying with transnational adoption standards.47 The moratorium left thousands of adoption cases pending.48 Like most countries, Guatemala
only recently took legislative measures to combat child commodification.49
Not until 1990 did Brazil impose legal restrictions aimed specifically at the
practice of baby selling, which was deep-rooted in many of its transnational
adoptions.50 Under Brazil’s Statute of the Child, prospective parents must obtain
approval for adoptions through the juvenile court system and must live with the
child in Brazil following approval for a period of fifteen to thirty days depending
on the child’s age.51 In addition, the statute eliminates all involvement of attorneys and other middlemen to ensure that all requirements are met and that the
process is free of corruption.52 Furthermore, priority for adopting is given to
Brazilian citizens.53 While these measures are aimed at the right concerns, im43

Rotabi et al., supra note 39.

44

Id.

U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children,
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, E/CN.4/2000/73/Add.2 (Jan. 27,
2000), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b0fe0.html (Ms. Calcetas-Santos has since admitted she could not substantiate her assertion that “legal adoption appears to be the exception rather than
the rule” with any statistical evidence).
46

Yemm, supra note 38, at 571.

47

Id. at 572.

48

Id. at 571.

49

Rotabi et al., supra note 39 (In 2006, the Guatemalan government established a pilot foster care
program, which recruited, trained, and monitored foster caregivers using clear professional standards. In
addition, all childcare institutions were required to complete an accreditation process and undergo monitoring by government authorities. By 2008, the Guatemalan government overhauled its adoption laws and
the U.S. suspended all new adoptions from Guatemala while the nation worked to clean up its adoption
proceedings).
Carro, supra note 18, at 133.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.
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plementation of the statute has proven to be unsuccessful as enforcement of its
provisions is weak.54
Europe

54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

65
66
67
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64

Id.
Carro, supra note 18, at 137.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 138.
Carro, supra note 18, at 137.
Carro, supra note 18, at 138.
Id.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 139-40.
Id.
Id.
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In some countries, such as Romania, child abandonment and child commodification is a socially acceptable cultural practice to which parents resort when they
can no longer care for their children.55 This practice has led to a constantly
growing pool of orphaned children living as outcasts in society.56 In 1991, transnational adoptions were suspended in Romania following the discovery of a baby
trafficking scandal that lasted for more than 25 years.57 During this period, referred to as the Romanian Baby Bazaar, the Romanian government banned contraception and legal abortions in an effort to increase the nation’s population.58
As a result, approximately 100,000 children were left abandoned in orphanages
and other institutions, some of which included inhumane warehouses.59 Birth
parents were willing to sell their children to the highest bidder, and even worse,
desperate adoptive parents were willing to pay any price to black marketers and
baby brokers.60
In 1990, the Romanian government passed an inter-country law to help ensure
that there was proper authorization for adoptions of Romanian children.61 The
legislation made it mandatory for parties to obtain consent from the child’s natural parents, guardian, or legal custodian prior to adoption.62 However, due to a
lack of international guidelines to abide by, the law failed to have any lasting
impact or serve its intended purpose.63 In 1991, the Romanian government
passed legislation that required the Romanian Adoption Commission to process
all adoptions.64 Furthermore, under the new law, children were only eligible for
transnational adoption if, after six months, attempts to place the child in Romania
proved unsuccessful.65 The new law’s intended purpose was to establish an organized, government-run adoption system and encourage domestic adoptions.66
However since its enforcement, Romania has placed severe limitations on transnational adoptions.67 Countries seeking Romanian orphans are now restricted to

35138-lfi_11-2 Sheet No. 40 Side B

06/12/2014 13:38:49

\\jciprod01\productn\L\LFI\11-2\LFI203.txt

unknown

Seq: 8

12-JUN-14

13:17

Understanding the Decline in Transnational Adoption Channels

no more than five pending adoption applications at any one time.68 In addition,
family size and age restrictions are placed on prospective parents seeking to
adopt from the country.69
Similar to Romania, the black market for transnational adoptions has long
thrived in Russia.70 Following the overthrow of communism, Russia’s economy
suffered great instability with many of its people living below the poverty line.71
As a result, many families surrendered their children for adoption.72 However,
Russia’s government lacked the resources and funds required to care for its growing population of orphaned children.73 Today, Russia aims to limit transnational
adoption to those children who cannot be successfully placed with families
through domestic adoption.74 However in many cases, Russian adoptive parents
wait years for their adoption applications to be approved, while foreign applications are approved within a few months.75 This discrepancy may be largely due
to the fact that Russia’s desperate economy benefits more from the fees associated with transnational adoptions when wealthy foreigners seek to adopt.76 Foreign adoptions in Russia typically cost between USD 10,000 and USD 26,000
and require a donation to the local orphanage ranging between USD 1000 and
USD 3000.77 Russia has yet to create any significant safeguards or barriers for
transnational adoption because for each child adopted, the nation’s financial burden decreases.78 Some of these same facilities partake in the black market baby
trade by seeking out bribes and kickbacks from foreign parents to pay local bureaucrats who process the adoption.79 Unfortunately, a lack of stringent law prevents the Russian government from monitoring illegal activities and effectively
controlling the high costs of transnational adoptions.80
IV. Transnational Adoption Legislation
While global legislative efforts have continuously been taken to regulate transnational adoption, they are often ineffective in directly addressing child exploita-
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Id.
Id.
70 Carro, supra note 18, at 141.
71 Kimberly A. Chadwick, The Politics and Economics of Intercountry Adoption in Eastern Europe,
4 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 113, 131 (1999).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Carro, supra note 18, at 141.
75 Id. at 142.
76 Chadwick, supra note 71, at 132.
77 Chadwick, supra note 71, at 130.
78 Id. at 132.
79 Shannon Thompson, The 1998 Russian Federation Family Code Provisions on Intercountry Adoption Break the Hague Convention Ratification Gridlock: What Next? An Analysis of Post-Ratification
Ramifications on Securing a Uniform Process of International Adoption, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 703, 725 (1999); see also Chadwick, supra note 71, at 121.
80 Id. at 718.
69
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tion and corrupt adoption practices. Common frustrations surrounding current
adoption legislation include vagueness in the language of most policies and a
lack of concrete measures that combat corruption.81
The Hague Adoption Convention

81

Volume 11, Issue 2

C M
Y K

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

149

06/12/2014 13:38:49

See infra notes 86 and 88.
Thompson, supra note 9, at 442.
83 Id.
84 Hague Adoption Process, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, http://adoption.state.gov/adoption_process/how_to_adopt/hague.php (last updated Oct. 2013).
85 Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §14901 (2000).
86 Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §14901 (2000).
87 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May
29, 1993, available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=69.
88 Id.
89 Thompson, supra note 9, at 457.
90 Id.
91 Thompson, supra note 9, at 443 (Critics of the Hague Convention contend that the treaty “fails to
provide a uniform standard which can be applied efficiently, realistically, and safely” and “lacks any kind
of evaluation process for participating states to rely on to ensure that internationally adopted children are
adequately protected”).
82
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The Hague Adoption Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of International Adoption (“Hague Convention”) serves as the
cornerstone for transnational adoption policy.82 The Hague Convention, implemented on May 1, 1995, is a multilateral treaty that serves as a blueprint for the
transnational adoption process.83 As of October 2013, ninety countries have ratified the Hague Convention, including the United States.84 In addition, to help
interpret and implement the Hague Convention, the United States adopted the
International Adoption Act of 2000 (“IAA”).85
The main objectives of the Hague Convention are to ensure that transnational
adoption is sought only if it is in the child’s best interest, to form and uphold a
system of global cooperation in an effort to curtail child exploitation, and to
ensure recognition of transnational adoptions that abide by the Convention’s
rules.86 In addition, the Convention acts as a safeguard to ensure that transnational adoptions are conducted in the best interests of the children involved with
respect to their fundamental rights as set out in international law.87 Furthermore,
it aims to establish cooperation among contracting states to prevent child abduction, sale, and trafficking.88 A nation need not ratify the Convention, however, to
be recognized as a cooperating state.89 Signing the treaty signals intent to eventually ratify the Hague Convention and prohibits the signatory from acting contrary to the Convention’s guidelines.90
While the Hague Convention has proven to provide a foundational structure
for regulating transnational adoptions and facilitating global cooperation between
participating countries, it fails to provide a uniform system that can realistically
grapple with the negative by-products of a rising demand for transnational adoptions.91 The Hague Convention functions as a set of guidelines and is only appli-
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cable to those nations that affirmatively ratify the treaty.92 It attempts to extend
its reach to non-signatories by granting participants the means to enforce its principles against non-participants who formally accede to it.93 However, the Convention lacks any specific enforcement mechanisms, such as an evaluation
process to help participants determine whether adoption agencies are taking illegal measures to secure children.94 While the IAA intends to aid in effectuating
the Hague Convention, it sets out incredibly vague standards and applies strictly
to the United States, similar to other adoption legislation.95
The Immigration and Nationality Act
To deal with countries that operate outside of the Hague Convention, the
United States employs The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), which provides procedural guidelines for carrying out some of the same international policies articulated in the Hague Convention.96 Currently, the INA is the only
federal law governing transnational adoptions between the United States and
non-signatories to the Hague Convention.97 Unfortunately, the INA’s exceptionally vague provisions invite misinterpretation and poor execution.98 For example, the INA fails to define terms such as “reasonable expenses.”99 This is
problematic because coercion and financial incentives plague the transnational
adoption arena.100 This type of vagueness in regulation prevents government
officials from identifying illegal activities and holding parties accountable for
perpetuating exploitative adoption practices.101 In addition, the INA sets an unrealistically high burden for proving immoral practices.102 It requires concrete
evidence or an admission of guilt to prove child buying.103 This high standard of
evidence renders enforcement of the INA exceptionally difficult and acts as a
“barrier preventing the INA from deterring child trafficking or any other unethical practices associated with transnational adoption.”104
Thompson, supra note 9, at 461, 466.

93

Id. at 459.

94

Id. at 466.

95

Katherine Herrmann, Reestablishing the Humanitarian Approach to Adoption: The Legal and Social Change Necessary to End the Commodification of Children, 44 FAM.L.Q. 409, 426 (2010).
96

Herrmann, supra note 95, at 425.
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The United Nations’ International Convention on the Rights of the Child
The United Nations’ International Convention on the Rights of the Child
(“CRC”) is as vague as The Hague Convention and the INA. The United Nations
intended the CRC to regulate several steps of the adoption process to meet the
best interests of the child involved.105 The treaty was entered into force in 1990
as the first instrument addressing the full range of children’s rights, including
civil, cultural, economic, political, and social rights.106 Currently, the 193 signatories to the CRC include all United Nations member states except Somalia and
the United States, which have merely signed the treaty and expressed an intention
to ratify it.107 The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child
monitors the practices of all signatory nations to ensure compliance with international law.108
A unique initiative under the treaty is its proposal to monitor the process by
which adults surrender children for adoption. Articles 9 and 10 of the CRC delegate the responsibility of ensuring that a child is not unwillingly separated from
his or her birth parents to the parties involved in the adoption proceeding.109
Addressing this stage of the adoption process is critical because parents who are
living in poverty and are desperate for income often relinquish their children for
meager financial gain to individuals who exploit the adoption market.110 While
the CRC’s approach is necessary to ensure that an adoption does not stem from a
circumstance of kidnapping or coercion, critics of the CRC emphasize that it
lacks an effective enforcement mechanism.111
The Impact of Current Transnational Adoption Legislation
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Yemm, supra note 38, at 560.
Convention on the Rights of the Child: Frequently Asked Questions, AMNESTY INT’L USA (2007),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/children-s-rights/convention-on-the-rights-of-the-child-0
[hereinafter AMNESTY INT’L USA].
107 AMNESTY INT’L USA, supra note 106; see also Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res.
44/25, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 9-10 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child].
108 AMNESTY INT’L USA, supra note 106.
109 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 107.
110 Thompson, supra note 9, at 448.
111 Herrmann, supra note 95, at 424.
112 Yemm, supra note 38, at 563 (There is considerable debate as to whether international mechanisms and adoption legislation, intended to support the best interests of children, have instead hindered
those interests by requiring expensive and time-consuming systems, such as effectuating moratoriums on
transnational adoptions); see also Thompson, supra note 9, at 449-450 (When moratoriums are in place,
children must wait for an indefinite time frame until suspension is lifted and endure subpar living conditions. In Cambodia, since the suspension of transnational adoption services in 2001, the mortality rate of
orphans under the age of five has consistently increased as children suffer from malnutrition and other
illnesses related to the conditions of their environment).
106
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The collective effort by developed countries to halt child exploitation in the
transnational adoption process has often had negative effects.112 Currently,
transnational adoption legislation promotes moratoriums on transnational adoption in nations where human rights violations are common in the adoption pro-
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cess.113 Moratoriums that result from the implementation of the Hague
Convention, the INA, and the CRC, are intended to encourage nations to “develop the appropriate administrative structures and capacity”114 to ensure that
adoption functions in the best interests of the children involved. However, “in
reality, compliance with the Hague and other adoption reforms seems to do little
to serve the best interests of children and more to improve international perception of the sending country.”115 For example, implementation of the Hague Convention stalled all transnational adoption proceedings between participants of the
Convention and Guatemala.116 The freeze of adoptions from Guatemala became
effective in 2007.117 While the Guatemalan government made significant reforms in its legislation, including taking steps to conform to the Hague Convention, five years passed before the United States lifted the moratorium.118
Throughout this process, the international community offered no solutions to the
conditions, nor did it make any efforts to help Guatemala expedite legislative
reform.119
Similarly, the United States and several other nations suspended Cambodian
adoption proceedings in 2001 due to allegations of fraud and child trafficking.120
In 2013, the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs made an official statement on its website stating that concerns were still high regarding Cambodia’s implementation and enforcement of the Convention’s ethical guidelines
despite Cambodia’s adoption of the Hague Convention and attempts to reform its
child welfare system.121
Freezing transnational adoption proceedings is often detrimental to the wellbeing of the child.122 Stalling adoption proceedings leave orphans vulnerable to
countless risks in their native countries including crime, drug abuse, and child
prostitution.123 For example, thousands of adoption cases remained pending due
to the temporary hold on adoption programs during the five-year moratorium

114 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2001 REGULAR REPORT ON ROMANIA’S PROGRESS
TOWARDS ACCESSION 24-25 (2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2001/ro_en.pdf.
115

Yemm, supra note 38, at 563.

116

Id. at 562.

117

Id. at 571.

118

Id.

119

Id. at 572.

120

Thompson, supra note 9, at 448-49.

Cambodia — Intercountry Adoption, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFF., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(Oct. 2009) http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_info.php?country-select=
cambodia (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
122

Thompson, supra note 9, at 451.

123

Id. at 448.
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113 Yemm, supra note 38, at 562; see also National Council for Adoption, Country Updates, https://
www.adoptioncouncil.org/intercountry-adoption/country-updates.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2014) (To
date, several countries have suspended all intercountry adoptions until further notice due to non-compliance with transnational adoption laws. These include Bhutan, Cambodia, Ghana, Russia, Rwanda, Vietnam, Guatemala, Haiti, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Montenegro).
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imposed on Guatemala.124 Without any concrete timeline, children wait for suspensions to be lifted with the risk that they may not qualify for adoption by the
time the moratoriums are removed.125 For example, Cambodia’s domestic law
prohibits the adoption of children over the age of eight.126 Therefore, while a
Cambodian child may satisfy the age requirement for adoption today, his chance
of finding a new family is ruined if he is too old for adoption once the moratorium is lifted. Such laws complicate the adoption process even further and only
harm the children involved. In addition, children are left to live in sometimes
violent and corrupt environments, deprived of the necessary and deserved
care.127 Given that these children usually originate from impoverished regions of
the world, they experience poor hygiene, unsanitary water supply, low quality
medical treatment, and malnutrition, leaving them susceptible to disease and infection including malaria, dengue fever, acute respiratory infection, typhoid, tuberculosis, and anemia.128 For these reasons, the mortality rate of Cambodian
children has risen since the moratorium was instituted in Cambodia.129
V. The Breakdown of CHIFF
In September 2013, United States Senators Mary Landrieu and Roy Blunt introduced the Children in Families First Act (“CHIFF”) to the United States Senate and in October 2013, United States Representatives Kay Granger and Karen
Bass introduced the bill to the United States House of Representatives.130 While
Congress has not yet voted on the bill, Senator Landrieu and her supporters continue to garner co-sponsorship.131 CHIFF’s primary goal is to timely match children in need of homes with adoptive parents.132 The Act further stresses the
importance of providing children with safe homes and relieving them of the subpar conditions often associated with their current environment.133 In addition, it
strengthens transnational adoption within the United States and around the world
to ensure that it becomes a viable and fully developed option for families.134
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Yemm, supra note 38, at 572.
Id.
126 Thompson, supra note 9, at 451.
127 Poulin, supra note 17, at 39-40 (Millions of teenagers and children are brought into the sex trade
annually and live in the red-light districts of urban metropolises in their own countries or those nearby
including the Philippines, Indonesia, India, Malaysia, Vietnam, Poland and Germany. These environments are plagued with acts of violence, kidnapping, and rape); see also infra note 156 (“Every day, all
over the world, more children find themselves living without families – on the streets, in orphanages, in
refugee camps”).
128 Thompson, supra note 9, at 450.
129 Id. at 449.
130 Children in Families First Act of 2013, H.R. 3323, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter CHIFF]; see
also Support CHIFF- Get Involved, CHILDREN IN FAMILIES FIRST, http://childreninfamiliesfirst.org/support-chiff-get-involved/.
131 Legislation: Children in Families First Act, CHILDREN IN FAMILIES FIRST (Apr. 8, 2014), available
at http://childreninfamiliesfirst.org/legislation-chiff/.
132 CHIFF, supra note 130, at 6.
133 Id. at 1.
134 Id.
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Specifically, CHIFF proposes various measures to achieve its goals through realignment of certain international child welfare responsibilities and functions (Title I), annual reporting (Title II), promotion of a comprehensive approach for
children in adversity (Title III), and funding and effective dates (Title IV).135
Within Titles I, II, and IV of CHIFF seven sections pertain specifically to
transnational adoption.136
Title I – Realignment of Certain International Child Welfare Responsibilities
and Functions
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Legislation: Children in Families First Act, supra note 131, at 2.
CHIFF, supra note 130, at 2.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 24, 27.
Id. at 28.
CHIFF, supra note 130, at 41.
Id.
Id. at 42.
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• Section 101 of Title I establishes a Bureau of Vulnerable Children and
Family Security in the Department of State, which develops and implements child welfare laws, regulations, and policies in foreign nations.137 The Bureau also creates policies to ensure that children
involved in both domestic and transnational adoptions are provided
with permanent family care in a timely manner.138
• Section 102 of Title I briefly lays out the responsibilities of the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) for the accreditation of adoption service providers.139 The accreditation process
is adopted from the IAA and the responsibilities assigned to the USCIS include, in part, working with the Secretary of State to operate a
publically accessible database of adoption service providers.140 Under
the provision, the database must include detailed information regarding international and domestic adoption agencies, including the accreditation status of an agency, descriptions of any sanctions filed
against the agency, and the number of applications filed, denied, and
approved at the agency.141
• Section 104 of Title I addresses the responsibilities of the Director of
the USCIS for adoption-related case processing.142 This includes the
responsibility to make case-specific decisions on all transnational
adoption cases prior to the application process for the adopted child’s
immigrant visa.143 In addition, the Director of the USCIS ensures that
each child is eligible to immigrate to the United States before the
adoption or grant of legal custody is issued and prior to the removal of
the child from his or her country of origin.144 Section 104 also ad-
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dresses steps the United States would take in cooperating with foreign
governments, specifically non-Hague Convention countries.145 The
Act specifies that the Department of Homeland Security may accept
adoption petitions on behalf of children living in a non-Convention
country, but the Department may only interact directly with that country’s central adoption authority in conducting adoption affairs.146

Title II – Annual Reporting

35138-lfi_11-2 Sheet No. 44 Side A

• Sections 201 of Title II delegates the Secretary of State and Director
of the United States Agency for International Development with the
task of creating detailed annual reports pertaining to children living
without families and countries where severe forms of child trafficking
is prevalent.147 These reports are submitted to Congress for review
and later discussed between the parties in more detail.148 The reports
covered by Section 201 include a vast range of information including
child nationality, living conditions, documentation type, parental status, the average time required for completion of immigration proceedings, and the range of adoption fees associated with transnational
adoptions.149 The Agency for International Development is responsible for reviewing trends to determine the highest areas of concern for
parentless children and for proposing programs to address these areas.150 The Act lays out a very specific timeline as to when the reports will be submitted, as well as when all parties will meet to discuss
their contents.151
• Section 202 of Title II aligns itself with provisions previously set out
in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (“FAA”) and further requires an
in depth trafficking report that details specific steps foreign governments have taken in reducing the number of orphaned, abused, neglected, and exploited children of those countries.152

Title IV – Funding and Effective Dates
Sections 401 and 402 of Title IV provide proposals for financial funding
and programming to help newly orphaned children.153 This includes the
145
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Id. at 45.
CHIFF, supra note 130, at 45.
Id. at 56, 61.
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Id. at 57-60.
Id. at 58.
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CHIFF, supra note 130, at 61.
Id. at 71.
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establishment of an emergency fund for children in adversity.154 These
funds are intended to address situations of civil unrest and disaster in
foreign countries with rapid impact programs.155

VI. Analysis
CHIFF will likely be an effective mechanism to advance the transnational
adoption process. However, additional reform is critical to create lasting change
for many countries. CHIFF takes unprecedented steps toward creating material
change by addressing the risks associated with transnational adoption such as
child commodification, adoption fraud, and the prolonged adoption process.156
Legislative Reform Stemming from CHIFF

154

Id. at 71-2.

155

CHIFF, supra note 130, at 71-2.

156

Legislation as Part of the Solution, CHILDREN IN FAMILIES FIRST – CHIFF (2014), available at
http://childreninfamiliesfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Children-in-Families-First-one-pager2014-03-18.pdf (CHIFF focuses on streamlining, simplifying, and consolidating responsibilities involved
in transnational adoptions for a more efficient process and implements a plan aimed specifically at children living in adversity that provides authority and oversight of resources).
157 Richard Carlson, Seeking the Better Interests of Children with a New International Law of Adoption, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 733 (2010).
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158 Legislation: Children in Families First Act, supra note 131, at 2 (Titles I through IV of CHIFF set
out steps for realigning certain international child welfare responsibilities and functions, reporting of the
transnational adoption landscape annually, generating funding to implement CHIFF’s goals, and establishing project time-frames (i.e. effective dates)).
159 Carlson, supra note 157.
160 CHIFF, supra note 130, at 65.
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Resolving the issue of prolonged transnational adoption proceedings extends
beyond reforming domestic government procedures.157 Two methods are necessary toward reforming the transnational adoption arena. The first is facilitating
change in the law and policy of nations from which adoptees originate. Parties
must ensure that investigative measures are taken to verify the legitimacy of
transnational adoptions. The second step consists of changing the law and policy
of the United States and nations that are accepting adoptees. These nations have
a duty to provide a second opportunity for verifying the legality and legitimacy
of adoption proceedings in foreign nations.
CHIFF works to detail program initiatives, set project deadlines for these initiatives, delegate the tasks and procedures laid out it its provisions to specific
government roles, and establish concrete budget restrictions.158
CHIFF sets out a plan to establish model programs for developing nations that
aim to integrate health, nutrition, developmental protection, and caregiving support for vulnerable children and families.159 The government’s role in providing
assistance to these programs will manifest through international, nongovernmental, and faith-based organizations.160 Furthermore, CHIFF provides adoption re-
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form in low-income nations it considers target countries.161 In an effort to ensure
long-term assistance, CHIFF facilitates measures for the Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development and Secretary of State to
carry out action plans for a minimum of five years in at least six countries that
the government classifies as priority nations.162
The Act works as a model for global reform by establishing specific programs
and initiatives in developing nations that need guidance (i.e. priority nations).163
In addition to setting up international programs, the Act gathers information on
foreign orphanages and orphaned children from annual reports and data.164 The
Act acknowledges that while many governments in other countries seek models
that promote child placement, they often “lack the resources or infrastructure to
adequately address this need.”165 In addition, the Act provides very specific proposals, budgeted costs, and timelines unlike previous legislation that consists of
ambiguous language.166
Social Reform and Global Outreach Efforts Stemming from CHIFF
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161 Kathryn Whetten, What’s Wrong with the Children in Families First Act, DUKE GLOBAL HEALTH
INST. (Nov. 1, 2013), https://globalhealth.duke.edu/media/news/whats-wrong-children-families-first-act.
162 CHIFF, supra note 130, at 69.
163 CHIFF, supra note 130, at 69.
164 Id. at 28.
165 Id. at 3.
166 CHIFF, supra notes 130 and 149.
167 Carro, supra note 18, at 134, 140-41.
168 Yemm, supra note 38, at 572.
169 Thompson, supra note 9, at 448.
170 Id.
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Transnational adoption is often viewed as a nuisance rather than a solution for
orphaned children as evidenced in countries like Romania and Russia, which
push for domestic over foreign adoptions.167 Furthermore, issuing moratoriums
tends to strain relationships between nations, especially because members of the
global community often refuse to help developing nations reform once an adoption moratorium is in place.168 However, orphaned children suffer indefinitely
when nations issue moratoriums and refuse to permit adoptions from a foreign
nation.169 Once adoption is no longer an option, orphans return to a life of poverty and become vulnerable to exploitation.170 Efforts to aid developing countries in adoption reform will enable the global community to keep adoption
channels open and ensure that orphaned children are afforded the right to a family. To achieve transnational adoption reform, the global community must implement strategies that promote comity between nations and make transnational
adoption an appealing and safe option. The implementation of CHIFF would act
as a catalyst for this reform, encouraging other nations to clarify ambiguous language in adoption legislation and turn policy into tangible results. By simplifying the domestic procedure for screening the legitimacy of transnational
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adoptions, CHIFF has the potential to strengthen transnational adoption domestically and globally.171
Efforts to address corruption in transnational adoption have traditionally consisted of penalizing those nations that violate international human rights by implementing moratoriums.172 However, this approach has continuously failed to
address underlying issues of corruption and as a result, orphaned children in
these nations suffer more than their offenders.173 It often takes decades for countries with moratoriums in effect to effectuate and fully implement policies that
abide by international standards because they are usually working alone with no
assistance or guidance from the global community.174 Children remain in orphanages with inferior living conditions indefinitely, eventually growing beyond
the legal age requirement to qualify for adoption.175
Promoting uniform and unambiguous adoption legislation, as well as encouraging the global community to assist developing nations in adoption reform, is
essential to create diplomacy between nations. Creating a supportive environment for nations that need adoption reform is crucial to ensure nations cooperate
and abide by transnational adoption standards. There is no doubt that CHIFF will
be a more efficient mechanism than the current adoption policy in providing
homes for children in need. However, further government efforts are necessary,
in countries sending and receiving adoptees, to address the underlying issue of
corrupt adoption practices.
VII. Proposal
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Legislation as Part of the Solution, supra note 156 and accompanying text.
Yemm, supra note 38, at 563; see also National Council for Adoption, supra note 113 (Indefinite
suspension of transnational adoptions is a common response from the global community when a nation
violates transnational adoption laws).
173 See Poulin, supra note 127 and accompanying text.
174 Yemm, supra note 38, at 571-72 (Reforms led by the Hague Convention require poverty-stricken
countries, like Guatemala, to revamp their adoption systems without the financial means to do so. In
attempting to comply with transnational adoption standards, the Guatemalan Department of Social Welfare started building a foster care system; but as of 2010 it had only recruited 45 domestic foster families
in a country of 13 million. In addition, the Guatemalan National Council on Adoptions notified the U.S.
of its desire to launch a “limited two-year pilot adoption program”. While expressing a desire for Guatemala to expedite reforms, the U.S. government and State Department have not offered any solutions to
remedy the conditions).
175 Thompson, supra note 9, at 451.
176 See Thompson, supra note 91 and accompanying text.
177 Stephanie Zeppa, “Let Me In, Immigration Man”: An Overview of Intercountry Adoption and the
Role of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 161, 163 (1998).
172
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Current adoption policy lacks consistency and demonstrates a need for uniformity amongst various transnational adoption laws to ensure that nations are
held accountable for regulating adoption practices and promoting ethical
norms.176 Developing uniform standards “involves a fusion of international
norms of human rights with different domestic, political and social policies [because] adoption, although a legal process, is dependent in many ways on the
cultural aspects of a country’s population.”177
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Changing Legislation
Fortunately, CHIFF will implement several procedures necessary to bring
about effective change where previous global legislation has failed, including
providing clarifications for vague language to help participants better interpret
and implement adoption practices. However, further measures, beyond those set
out in CHIFF, are necessary to accomplish lasting reform. For example, legislation should require mandatory licensing to establish foreign facilitators as employees of adoption agencies for international and domestic accountability.
Furthermore, establishing a routine review process is essential for nations and
organizations to uphold the standards set by adoption policies. Such a review
process will also ensure conformity because all parties will be held equally accountable for their efforts in implementing ethical practices. In addition, legislation must institute a concrete and consistent system of enforcement mechanisms
to address parties partaking in immoral practices at every level of the adoption
process, without sabotaging adoption proceedings nationwide whenever discrepancies are discovered. In addition to subjecting violators to constant close monitoring, these methods should include enforcing monetary sanctions on specific
agencies that violate transnational adoption law.
Changing Social Norms
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178 Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues, 13 BUFF. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 151, 196 (2007).
179 Kevin Voigt, International Adoption: Saving Orphans or Child Trafficking, CNN (2013), available at http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/16/world/international-adoption-saving-orphans-child-trafficking/
(Brokers, who source children for adoption agencies, typically earn as much as 5000 USD per child that
they deliver, substantially more than they would otherwise earn. As a result, whole economies tend to
emerge when transnational adoption starts to thrive in a developing nation and many individuals see
adoption as a lucrative business).
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Community outreach is an essential component in resolving underlying human
rights violations in adoption. While legislation like CHIFF is a step toward addressing the human rights issues surrounding transnational adoptions, policy reform alone will never be a solution to such a complex global crisis. Instead,
policy makers must consciously link new adoption reform with efforts to improve living conditions for children being adopted, as well as their birth parents.178 In many impoverished nations, there is widespread acceptance of
disregarding orphans’ well-being in exchange for compensation.179 One of the
only ways to counteract this mindset is to remove financial incentives associated
with transnational adoption, which fuels corrupt practices. It is just as important
for adoption agencies to educate prospective adoptive parents on the importance
of giving back to their child’s birth country. Not only will doing so help familiarize adoptive parents with the customs of their child’s birth country, but it will
help improve the living conditions of other families and children experiencing
severe hardship. Lastly, agencies must educate parents on how to recognize
signs of corrupt practices in transnational adoption proceedings and take steps
toward reporting this activity.
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Due to the rise in child commodification, there is a need for continued community outreach in addition to legislative policy that takes measures to change
societal attitudes regarding transnational adoption. Only by addressing each nation’s underlying human rights issues in transnational adoption can adoption
channels be safely reopened. The United States government should ratify CHIFF
because the Act is an effective mechanism in regulating transnational adoption
practices.
VIII. Conclusion
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Both community outreach efforts and legislative reform are critical toward
effectively addressing issues of child commodification and reopening transnational adoption channels for prospective parents. To date, the global community
has used international laws and policies to combat human rights violations in
adoption by penalizing developing countries. However, this approach fails to
result in permanent transformational change.
To ensure global cooperation, nations must work to build supportive environments that consist of providing necessary aid to other nations instead of severing
ties. Nations must stop resorting to moratoriums as a default response to child
exploitation and adoption fraud without taking initiative to proactively aid in reform. The process of reopening adoption channels is prolonged when developing
countries must navigate without any outside assistance. As a result, orphaned
children remain without a permanent home and family. Assisting nations with a
long history of corrupt adoption practices will not only promote comity, but it
will also encourage uniformity in policy and procedure.
The legislative aspect of adoption reform is equally important in addressing
corruption. Aside from uniformity in policy, nations must work together to
achieve more unambiguous laws that are easy to interpret and produce concrete
results. Reforming legislative efforts is crucial in mitigating child commodification and reopens transnational adoption channels, making transnational adoption
more accessible for families.
If enacted, CHIFF will operate as a guide for future adoption legislation that
provides specific initiatives, goals, and measures for globally effectuating reform.
However, adopting the Children in Families First Act will not alone eradicate the
many injustices in inter-country adoptions. Global commitment to reforming societal standards within developing nations is a critical component in mitigating
the commodification of orphans and reopening transnational adoption channels.

